In this paper I show that -in contrast to the …ndings in the previous literature -substitutable workers can be better o¤ negotiating in separate unions and complementary workers in one encompassing union. In addition, I …nd that results do not di¤er if two craft unions merge and negotiate as one bargaining agent or whether two separate craft unions negotiate with …rms in one negotiation.
Introduction
Firms with heterogeneous workers are omnipresent. Mostly, …rms cannot produce goods or services without heterogeneous and often complementary workers. Examples are manifold: manufacturing …rms need at least blue and white collar workers, hospitals employ physicians, nurses, administration o¢ cers etc., airlines cannot conduct ‡ights without pilots as well as ‡ight attendants. Furthermore, each group of workers is not interchangeable. This complicates collective wage negotiations: how should workers organize themselves? Heterogeneous workers have to decide about two dimensions of organization. They must agree on the intra-union degree of heterogeneity and on the degree of centralization of the union. Concerning heterogeneity, workers have the choice of forming a union unifying workers along the lines of the particular profession (i.e., craft unions). Otherwise, they can establish comprehensive unions, where all workers in one …rm or industry, independent of their profession, are organized within one encompassing union. With regard to centralization, workers have to determine if they want to form …rm speci…c, industry wide, or even national unions.
In fact, most countries are characterized by a coexistence of di¤erent levels of heterogeneity as well as centralization. It is not obvious that an optimal level of the two dimensions exist. Moreover, the existing levels of centralization and heterogeneity of unions do not seem to be stable over time or countries and are in ‡uenced by several factors.
The literature on wage negotiations with heterogeneous workers (e.g., Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Dowrick (1993) ) is conclusive. They …nd that complementary workers should negoti-1 Acknowledgement: This paper was part of my PhD thesis and I am solely responsible for the content which does not necessarily represent the opinion of Frontier Economics. I wish to thank participants at the DFG workshop in Essen, DIW workshop in Berlin and the Hohenheimer Oberseminar in Nuremberg, especially Jürgen Zerth for helpful comments. ate separately. 1 The reasons for this conclusion di¤er: Horn and Wolinsky take labor demand as given and show, that with separate negotiations workers do not take into account losses in ‡icted on other heterogeneous workers during strikes. Instead, Dowrick assumes an endogenous labor demand. If unions of complementary workers negotiate separately, they do not internalize the negative e¤ect higher wages have on the employment of complementary workers. Thus, both papers conclude that individual wages are higher with separate negotiations. Substitute workers are better o¤ within one union since …rms cannot pit them against each other in that case.
These papers suggest that in equilibrium, substitutable workers are organized within one union, but no comprehensive unions exist. Maybe this is due to the fact that all models assume that bargaining strengths are equal for complementary groups of workers. The idea of my model is to analyze a situation where heterogeneous workers establish unions. Craft unions have heterogeneous and exogenous bargaining strengths. I draw comparisons between di¤erent levels of centralization and heterogeneity. Furthermore, I do not only compare wages but also union utility. I assume that union utility is increasing in wages and employment and thus, even if wages are lower, employment can be higher in equilibrium and this can be advantageous for unions. After all, I cannot unambiguously con…rm previous results: First, in my model, it can be pro…table for complementary workers to form an encompassing union. This is true for a strong craft union. When its bargaining strength is relatively strong in comparison to the other craft, it can be advantageous to form a coalition with a weak union even if these workers are complements. Wages as well as employment are higher with a coalition. It is also not always true that unions of substitutable workers should merge. Here, weak union bene…ts from a union merger. Again wages and employment are higher with a merger.
As a second result, I …nd that it does not matter whether two craft unions merge to one union and negotiate with …rms or whether they both bargain in one negotiation round as antagonistic parties with …rms. This is also in contrast to the claim that complementary unions should not merge. It simply does not matter if they merge or bargain separately in one negotiation round.
The theoretic literature on wage determination with unionized labor markets and heterogeneous (i.e., substitutable and complementary) workers is thin. The noteworthy papers are Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , Dowrick (1993) , and Gürtzgen (2003) . Horn and Wolinsky assume a …xed rent which can be distributed between workers of di¤erent groups and the …rm. They apply an extended version of the bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) to obtain solutions. The process of wage determination is di¤erent to other papers: …rms …rst choose employment, then workers decide on the patterns of unionization and in the last stage wage determination takes place. The …rm chooses employment seeing through the next stages, knowing how the employment decision will a¤ect the patterns of unionization and the wage negotiations. The authors choose this alternative setting compared to the wage-employment-negotiation literature to model a situation in which …rms cannot change employment substantially without changing labor contracts with unions. Their main …ndings are straightforward: If the two types of workers are complements, they maximize their utility when they organize themselves in separate unions. If workers are substitutes in production they are better o¤ if they form an encompassing union. This results from the fact that for substitutable workers one union is not better o¤ withdrawing unilaterally and forming a separate union. The same is true for complementary workers: they are always better o¤ in di¤erent unions since no distribution exist where not one groups would withdraw and form a separate union and obtain a higher payment.
Dowrick extends the Horn and Wolinsky paper in several ways. First, he takes product market competition into consideration. In his model, two …rms compete in a market and higher wages in one …rm in ‡uence wages in the other …rm. Second, he sets up eight di¤erent cases which should capture di¤erent structural features of union and …rm organization structure and bargaining locus. Third, strike payo¤s which change wage negotiations are endogenous. Fourth, he assumes a symmetric Nash-Bargaining Solution to model wage negotiations. His main result is that a simple look at the negotiation level is not conclusive. Clear e¤ects arise only when the level of organization-especially the one of the unions-is changed in the same way as the level of negotiation. Like Horn and Wolinsky he …nds that substitutable workers should form an encompassing union. However, Dowrick (1993) does not …nd that an encompassing employers' association has systematic e¤ects on wages. Even the bargaining locus has very ambiguous e¤ects. But Dowrick (1993) shows that the claim to reduce the level of bargaining to …rm negotiation to lower wages can be misleading: if unions and …rms also decentralize their level of organization wages can rise.
However, Dowrick only takes organization cases into consideration where unions are organized on craft level or merge to industry craft unions. He does not consider mergers of di¤erent craft unions to industry unions organizing di¤erent types of workers. This is the idea of Gürtzgen. She answers the question what happens if unions do not only merge "horizontally" like in Dowrick (1993) where cooperation takes places on the professional line. She also analyzes "vertical"mergers, where centralization across …rm or industry lines occurs. Di¤erent from Dowrick, Gürtzgen assumes that unions can set the wages and …rms employment. She refrains from modeling wage negotiations. Her main …nding is that a ranking of wages according to the degree of centralization is not possible. A more decentralized bargaining does not necessarily lead to lower wages.
The Model
In my model unions and …rms negotiate over wages under di¤erent wage negotiation regimes. Unions are upstream suppliers of workers in a labor market and …rms compete in a product market. After …rms and unions have agreed on wages, …rms choose quantities and, therefore, employment in the product market. The game proceeds as follows:
1. Wage negotiations take place, and 2. …rms set quantities in the product market.
In the downstream market two …rms compete with pro…ts of
where i = 1; 2 and c i are the marginal cost of production. To keep it simple, cost is solely labor cost. It is assumed that each …rm needs two types of complementary workers (i.e., workers of di¤erent crafts) to produce the …nal output. For one unit of the end product, N workers of type n and M workers of type m are needed. Wages for these workers are w n and w m , respectively. Thus, the cost for one unit of the end product is c i = N w in + M w im with i = 1; 2. The inverse demand function is
At most, four unions are active in the upstream labor market, U 1n ; U 1m ; U 2n ; and U 2m : The number indicates the …rm the union negotiates with, the latter the type of worker the union represents, for example U 1n represents the union utility for all workers in …rm 1 of craft n: Union utility increases with w ij and x i ; that is, more workers employed and higher wages increase union utility:
I analyze six union and …rm organization structures (i.e., cases, henceforth). Each of these negotiations is solved applying an asymmetric Nash-Bargaining Solution (see Figure 1) Dobson (1997) ).
III. Two industry craft unions, each union bargains in one negotiation with both …rms over industry-wide craft wages Until now, each union has negotiated separately. Now I assume that workers of one craft working in di¤erent …rms negotiate together. They try to maximize their joint utility by setting the industry craft wage w n or w m . Two negotiations take place in the industry, where an industry craft union negotiates with both …rms. During the negotiations each craft union internalizes how the wage a¤ect wages of workers of the same craft in the other …rm.
IV. Two industry craft unions, industry wide craft wages, one industry wide negotiation In one centralized negotiation two industry wide craft unions negotiate with the two …rms.
V. Two …rm speci…c unions representing two di¤ erent types of workers, one negotiation with each …rm In a …rst negotiation two distinct crafts in one …rm bargain for the internal distribution of rents if they merge and form one …rm speci…c union. Workers of di¤erent crafts in one union agree on a relative wage = w in =w im . Afterwards the merged union bargains with its …rm over absolute wages.
VI. One industry union negotiates with one employers' association
This case is similar to V , but instead of two …rm speci…c unions, one industry union representing both types of workers agree on a relative industry wage = w n =w m : Afterwards this industry union bargains with one employers'association.
The game is solved by backward induction: First the …rms maximize their pro…ts choosing
resulting in 
I. Two negotiations per …rm, unions negotiate separately
The negotiations are modeled using a Nash-Bargaining Solution. Overall, four wage negotiations take place between unions and …rms,
where a; b; and c are the bargaining strengths of unions and of the …rm respectively. Maximizing the Nash-Bargaining Solutions with respect to w in and w im yields the following results:
Plugging this back into (1), (2); (3), (5), and (6), yields the equilibrium results for quantities, pro…ts, union utility, and welfare which can be found in the Appendix.
II. One negotiation per …rm, unions negotiate separately Now, only two wage negotiations take place
i f or i = 1; 2. This Nash-Bargaining Solution is maximized choosing w in and w im and the four wages are
; and
Again, the results for quantities, price, pro…ts and union utility can be found in the Appendix.
III. Two industry craft unions, each union bargains in one negotiation with both …rms over industry wide craft wages Here, negotiations take place on the industry level. Workers of the same craft in di¤erent …rms form an encompassing union. Craft union utility is
Both industry wide craft unions negotiate with both …rms separately over industry wide craft wages w n and w m ,
Maximizing the Nash-Bargaining Solution with respect to w n and w m yields,
IV. Two industry craft unions, one industry wide negotiation, industry wide craft wages Both …rms and both industry craft unions negotiate over wages w n and w m in one industry wide negotiation,
These industry negotiations result in industry wide wages of w n and w m . The …nal wages they agree on are
.
V. Two …rm speci…c unions representing two di¤ erent types of workers, one negotiation with each …rm Di¤erent than before, negotiations do not take place simultaneously. Since workers of di¤erent crafts form an encompassing union, they agree on the distribution of rents …rst. Afterwards, each encompassing unions negotiates with its …rm. Solving the game backward, I …rst maximize the Nash-Bargaining product of the union-…rm negotiation
and afterwards the intra-union negotiation,
For simplicity, I assume that the union bargaining strength when the two crafts negotiate together equals the sum of their individual bargaining strength alone. Solving this model backwards, during the union-…rm negotiations, both parties take relative wages as given.
In the intra union negotiation, crafts negotiate over relative wages. The equilibrium results are equal to the ones found in case II.
VI.
One industry union negotiates with one employers' association Again, wage negotiations are not simultaneous. Solving backwards, I …rst maximize the industry wide Nash-Bargaining product with one union and one employers' association, taken relative wages as given,
Afterwards, in a second round, the two industry craft unions distribute their rents
Maximizing this expression with respect to relative wages results in the equilibrium wages.
Here results are equal to case IV .
2. Cases IV and V I are equal for a bargaining strength of the encompassing union of 2(a + b).
At …rst glance, it is surprising that wages are equal in cases II and V . In case II; the two unions and the …rm negotiate together in one bargaining round as three con ‡icting parties. However, this results in the same wages as in case V . Here, craft unions form an encompassing union and agree on allocation quotas for their joint rent in a …rst negotiation. Afterwards, they bargain as one "strong" union representing di¤erent crafts within the …rm. It does not matter whether the unions merge and bargain as one party (one union framework, henceforth), or negotiate separately but in one negotiation round with the …rm (i.e., one negotiation framework ).
It is quite amazing, in fact, that an individual utility maximization in case II yields the same results as a joint utility maximization in case V . In the second case the di¤erent craft unions do not internalize the negative external e¤ect their wage has on workers of the other craft in the same …rm in their utility function. This e¤ect is internalized in case V , the share of the burden of the external e¤ect each craft has to bear is determined through negotiations. However, results are the same. To show why one union and one negotiation framework result in equal wages, I use a simpler model:
Assume three parties negotiate for a cake A. The size of the cake is …xed and does not change due to the negotiation. This is di¤erent to the original setting-unions and …rms can in ‡uence the size of the rent through the wage-but this is simpler and does not in ‡uence the results. The parties negotiation strengths are a; b, and c; respectively. They all try to maximize utility and utility is de…ned as the part of the cake they receive,
where ; ; and (1 ) are the shares of the cake the parties receive. In the one negotiation framework the asymmetric Nash-Bargaining Solution for the three parties is
Maximizing the Nash-Bargaining Solution with respect to the shares and yields:
As can be seen nicely here, shares are distributed relative to the bargaining strengths. Solving for and results in equilibrium shares of
Hence, equilibrium utilities for the three parties are:
What is di¤erent in a one union framework ? Here, two parties form a coalition and divide the rent they receive from a negotiation with the third party in a separate negotiation. Let us assume that the …rst and the second party form a coalition and their joint utility is V 1+2 = ( + ) A: When this coalition negotiates with the third party, assume that their bargaining strength in this negotiation round is simply the sum of their individual strengths. Then the asymmetric Nash-Bargaining Solution is,
Again, the shares are relatively distributed to their negotiations strengths. The share of the cake the coalition gets is
Stated di¤erently, the …rst and second party receives a slice with a size of B := (a+b)=(a+b+c)A.
In another negotiation round, they have to distribute this slice B. The Nash-Bargaining Solution for this negotiation is
For simplicity, rewrite the utility functions as V 1 = B; V 2 = (1 )B. The size of the slice is not in ‡uenced through the negotiations, it is …xed at this stage. Maximizing the Nash-Bargaining Solution yields the well known result:
The share of the slice B the …rst party receives is = a=(a + b) which yields an overall utility for the …rst party of
As can be seen in this expression, party 1 receives a share of a=(a + b) of the slice B which is equal to a a + b
of cake A. This result is driven by the fact that I assume that the bargaining strengths after forming a coalition are the sum of the individual bargaining strengths. Otherwise the cumulative bargaining strength a + b would not be simply cancel out in Eq. 7. When I loosen that assumption and assume that the cumulative strength is higher than the individual, not surprisingly, the coalition would receive a higher share than negotiating separately and the third party would su¤er.
To sum up, it does not matter whether union negotiate as one party in a negotiation (i.e., one union framework ) or as two con ‡icting parties in one negotiation (i.e., one negotiation framework ) as long as the bargaining strength of the coalition is the sum of the individuals. The negative external e¤ect of higher wages on the di¤erent crafts is a mirror-inverted e¤ect. Higher wages of m type workers reduces employment of n type workers and vice versa. Due to a Nash-Bargaining Solution which maximizes the whole cake A; depending on both union utility and …rm pro…ts, this e¤ect is internalized as it reduces cake size and does not lead to higher or lower wages than in case V where this e¤ect is directly internalized through the unions'utility function.
Exactly the same argumentation is true for wages in case IV and V I. Here as well, the formation of a coalition-also on …rm side-makes no di¤erence to a single negotiation. The negotiations yields the same results as long as the coalition bargaining strength is the sum of the individual ones.
This result is empirically supported by Machin, Stewart, and van Reenen (1993) and Metcalf (1993) . They show for British workers that wages do not di¤er between the one union framework and one negotiation framework. However, a theoretical explanation for this fact was missing in their papers.
Comparing the Negotiation Cases
The aim of my paper is to …nd out which of the negotiation cases …rms and unions prefer and which is welfare maximizing. Therefore, with heterogeneous bargaining strengths, I compare quantities, wages, pro…ts, union utility, and welfare for di¤erent cases. As established above, I can reduce six regimes to four, as it turned out that two of them lead to the same results. First, I will present the results for quantities and pro…ts in the di¤erent cases, and afterwards, wages, union utility, and welfare comparisons are shown.
To understand the changes due to di¤erent negotiation regimes it is helpful to calculate derivatives to better understand the e¤ects. First, a change in wages changes the quantities produced,
Derivatives with respect to wages show that quantities decrease if the own wages increase, and quantities increase if wages of the competitor increase. This should not be surprising as long as wages are a cost for …rms and an increase in own cost reduces quantities produced, and higher cost of competitors increase own production. However, since the model is a linear Cournot model, pro…ts are squared equilibrium quantities, and the derivative signs of quantities correspond with the derivative signs of pro…ts. Second, a change of wages has an indirect e¤ect on wages of the other workers through employment,
If wages of complementary workers in the same …rm w im increase, this is a negative externality for wages w in because quantity x i is reduced and ceteris paribus less workers of type n are needed. Additionally, through the product market e¤ects, higher wages of workers in the other …rm, w jn and w jm increase the cost for …rm j, therefore production of …rm i increases and due to that wages w in .
Comparing the di¤erent negotiation cases, most results are driven by the fact that workers organize themselves in such a way that they internalize (or not) the external e¤ects that their wages have on other groups. Stated di¤erently, when complementary workers of one …rm form an encompassing union they do internalize the e¤ect of higher wages on employment of complementary workers within the same …rm. This lowers, ceteris paribus, wages within the …rm. In contrast, when workers of di¤erent …rms form one union, they internalize the positive e¤ect higher wages have on employment of workers in the other …rm and this ceteris paribus increases wages. Analogously, …rms can internalize the positive e¤ect of higher wages (and therefore lower quantities) on each other. Thus, an employers'association lowers wages.
Quantities and Firm Pro…ts
With these general e¤ects established above in mind, the order of the quantities of di¤erent regimes is plausible:
The highest production occurs when each …rm negotiates with its two craft unions in one negotiation. In this case II, the product of the union utilities and …rm pro…ts is maximized in the negotiation. Therefore, the negative external e¤ect that higher wages of w in have on w im (and vice versa) through lower employment are internalized.
3 This internalization of the negative external e¤ect leads ceteris paribus to lower wages and higher quantities. Additionally, …rms do not negotiate in one round and for that reason they do not internalize the positive external e¤ect a lower quantity would have on the competitor. Hence, production is highest in case II.
The lower quantity in case I is obvious. When the two crafts negotiate separately, they do not keep in mind the negative e¤ects of higher wages on the other type of workers in the same …rm. They demand higher wages, employment in the …rm is reduced and this results compared to II in lower quantities.
In case IV one industry wide negotiation takes place. All four unions take the negative and positive external e¤ects into account. The e¤ect of this on quantities is ambiguous: higher wages have negative external e¤ects on quantities produced in that …rm, but positive e¤ects on quantities of the other …rm. However, …rms do internalize the positive e¤ect of lower quantities on their competitor and thus reduce production. Overall quantities are lower in case IV than in case I; only for unions with the same bargaining strength (i.e., a = b), one can show that quantities are the same for I and IV .
In case III; the lowest quantities are produced. Here, industry craft unions negotiate with …rms separately. Unions do not take the negative e¤ect of higher wages on workers of the same …rm but di¤erent crafts into consideration and employment and quantities are reduced compared to IV . Unsurprisingly, the order of prices is opposite to that of quantities. Since in this Cournot model pro…ts are equal to the squared equilibrium quantities, we also know:
This is true independent of the values of the bargaining strengths of …rms and unions and the reasons are similar to the explanation for quantities: pro…ts are just squared equilibrium quantities. Pro…ts are highest for …rms if they negotiate only with …rm speci…c unions and especially when the di¤erent crafts take the negative external e¤ects of higher wages into account. Even when the unions do not consider the negative e¤ects but again the …rms negotiate separately on …rm-level with their unions this leads to high pro…ts. Unambiguously, pro…ts for the …rms are lower if unions of di¤erent crafts merge.
Wages
The ranking of wages in the di¤erent cases is much more puzzling than the ranking of quantities and pro…ts. Independent of the bargaining strength, wages in case II are always lower than in III and IV . This is not surprising, due to the fact that in case II the workers of one craft in one …rm take the negative e¤ects of higher wages on the workers of the other craft into account. This lowers wages. Instead, in III and IV , industry wide craft unions were formed, taking the positive externality into account which leads to higher wages, but not to the negative externality on complementary workers.
The relationships between w is even more complicated. They strongly depend on the bargaining strengths of the various parties. Thus, it is helpful to model the e¤ects in ‡uencing wages for w 1n and w 1m in a more formal way.
4 , 5 Let us assume union utility is de…ned as U in and U im ; and pro…ts are i and j .
First, I compare cases I and II: I argue above that in case I; where the two craft unions negotiate separately, they do not internalize the negative e¤ects of higher wages on complementary workers in the same …rm and demand for higher wages. Hence, wages w I in should be higher than w II in . However, this is not true in general. To show why, I compute the implicit function to obtain w I 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ) in case I by logarithmically derivating the corresponding Nash-Bargaining Solution N = U a 1n c 1 :
This de…nes the wage function 6 w I 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ). Here, two e¤ects occur. A variation of wage w 1n has a direct e¤ect on U 1n and it also in ‡uences the …rm. For further analysis, it is helpful to remind the behavior of the wage function. As can be shown easily,
Put another way, the wage function w I 1n is downward sloping in higher wages of complementary workers in …rm 1 and upwards sloping in wages of workers in …rm 2. Plotting the wage function w I 1n (w 1m ) keeping w 2n ; w 2m constant is a decreasing function (see Figure 2) increase with increasing wages in …rm 2 and decrease with higher wages of the complementary workers w 1m . Here, three e¤ects a¤ect the wage function: One is the direct e¤ect on union utility of the workers under consideration. The next is an indirect e¤ect on the union utility of complementary workers U 1m through quantities and, …nally, the in ‡uence on …rm pro…ts. This is strictly negative as long as higher wages reduce …rm pro…ts. 
This implies that the wage function w The outward shift is here
Whether the wages are higher or lower with downward sloping wage functions depends on the shifts S 1 and S 2 and thus a and b. As you can see in Figure 2 ; the outward shift with downward sloping demand functions can result in lower wages. Wages w Let's call this e¤ect wage e¤ ect. Obviously it is negative. How strong this negative e¤ect is, depends on the value of b; (see Eq. 12) that is the bargaining strength of the complementary workers. In addition, there is an employment e¤ ect. During wage negotiations of complementary workers of type m, they also take into account the negative e¤ect they have on worker type n. This e¤ect becomes large with a high bargaining strength a (see Eq. 13). For a high a; w II im becomes low compared to w I im , this leads to a higher employment and increases the employment of workers of both types. This also yields higher wages of type n workers. To sum it up, the negative wage e¤ ect can be outweighed by a positive employment e¤ ect when the bargaining strengths are su¢ ciently di¤erent. This can be seen for workers of type n in Figure 2 ; contrary to that, the employment e¤ ect does not outweigh the wage e¤ ect for workers of type m:
Theoretically, the crucial point is that when one assumes symmetric union utility functions, one way to establish this result are varying bargaining strengths. In the literature this result is new. Davidson compares substitutable workers with upward sloping best response functions where no positive employment e¤ ect occurs. Dowrick assumes complementary workers and wage negotiations. However, he assumes symmetric bargaining strengths which shifts the wage functions outwards by the same value and the employment e¤ ect never outweigh the wage e¤ ect.
Finally, Gürtzgen also assumes complementary workers but abstracts from wage negotiations and, therefore, this e¤ect does not occur.
One could also think about symmetric bargaining strengths but asymmetric union utility functions or union sizes to establish similar results. The value of the outward shift depends not only on union strength but also on union utility and the cross derivative (see Eqs. 12 and 13).
If theses values are very distinct, similar e¤ects with lower wages in case I can occur. Examples one can think of are unions of very di¤erent sizes or wage oriented vs. employment oriented unions.
The relation between w III and w IV is comparable to w I vs. w II . To …nd w III 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ) one has to solve
and for w IV 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m )
Again, one …nds a direct e¤ect of a wage increase for w III 1n and w IV 1n , but an indirect e¤ect only for w IV 1n and the slopes of wage functions are as expected: in both cases wages w 1n increase in w 2n and w 2m . They always decrease with w 1m . To …nd the direction of the shift, I calculate (15) at w III 1n using (14) and get
Thus, w III 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ) shifts to the right of w IV 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ).
7
The intuitive explanation is analogous to the comparison between I and II. At …rst sight it seems obvious that wages in case III are higher compared to IV as long as the negative external e¤ect on complementary workers is internalized under IV . Put di¤erently, the negative wage e¤ ect only occurs in case IV and one expects lower wages there. However, when the two union strengths are su¢ ciently di¤erent, I …nd again a positive employment e¤ ect. For workers of type n this means that when their bargaining strength a is high and bargaining strength b of type m is low, the wage e¤ ect is modest. In addition, workers of type m are confronted with a larger negative wage e¤ ect, their wages are low and this has a positive external employment e¤ ect on workers of type n.
Di¤erent explanations are necessary for the comparison of wages in cases I and III. I compute w I 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ) and w III 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ) again (see (11) and (14)). To …nd the direction of the shift, I evaluate (14) at w I 1n using (11). Taking advantage of the symmetry of the …rms in the model, the …rm e¤ects are equal and the shift is therefore,
7 It can also be established that for a comparison between w III 1m (w 1n ; w 2n ; w 2m ) and w IV 1m (w 1n ; w 2n ; w 2m ) ; the shift is S 4 := a=Un dUn=dw 1m < 0. Again, w IV 1m (w 1n ; w 2n ; w 2m ) lies at the right side of w III 1m (w 1n ; w 2n ; w 2m ) : . This means, that when the workers of type n are weak and the complementary workers are strong, it can lead to higher wages if they negotiate separately with their …rm and do not form an industry wide union an negotiate with both …rms together.
Finally, the comparison of wages between case I and IV is puzzling. For the same bargaining strength union wages under I and IV are equal. Wages do not di¤er whether each …rm speci…c craft union negotiates separately with its …rm, or whether two industry speci…c craft unions are formed and negotiate in one round with both …rms an industry wide wage. In case I unions do not take into account any positive or negative external e¤ects. In case IV unions take all positive and the negative e¤ects under consideration. Additionally, in case I only one …rm takes part in each negotiation, in case IV negative and positive external e¤ects between …rms are internalized.
To compare the wage functions, I calculate (15) at w I 1n (w 1m ; w 2n ; w 2m ) using (11). Bene…ting from the symmetry of the …rms in the model, …rm e¤ects are equal and the shift equals Second the substitutable worker e¤ect is always positive. 8 This is due to the well known fact, that 1=U n dU n =dw n internalizes the positive e¤ect higher wages have on substitutable workers. This leads ceteris paribus to a w IV that should be higher than w I . Which e¤ect, the complementary worker or the substitutable worker e¤ ect predominates, depends on a and b: For a = b these two e¤ects outweigh each other and wages are equal under I and IV . However, for a > b the substitutable worker e¤ect dominates and w I is lower than w IV ; if b > a the complementary worker e¤ect dominates and w IV < w I . Here the employment e¤ ect due to asymmetric shifts of wage functions of workers of complementary crafts does not matter: To see this, I calculate the shift for w im : 
Unions
Union utility increases in wages and employment. Thus, the ranking of union utility in di¤erent cases is a combined e¤ect of quantities and wages. As shown above, results for quantities have a clear sorting whereas the ranking of wages is ambiguous. Due to that, the ranking for union utility is also ambiguous.
Proposition 5 Obviously, union utility is higher in case IV than in case II. This due to the fact that wages are higher in case IV: However, employment is highest in case II, but this cannot outweigh lower wages. Therefore, unions prefer one industry wide negotiation about industry wages with industry craft unions to one negotiation per …rm with …rm speci…c craft unions.
A little bit astonishing, a comparison between case II and III does not always lead to a higher union utility in case III even if wages are always higher in that case. The higher employment in case II outweighs higher wages if union strength is high and complementary union and …rm strength low. Here, unions favor lower wages and higher employment to higher wages and lower employment. Stated in economic terms, if the union is strong, it is advantageous to stay as a …rm speci…c craft union and negotiate on …rm level than to merge with substitutable workers in the other …rm and negotiate over industry wages. This is a result di¤erent to the ones published before which always suggest that substitutable workers should form one encompassing union. This leads to higher wages, indeed, but can be disadvantageous due to lower employment.
The comparison of wages between I and II; I and III; and III and IV is ambiguous. I found an employment e¤ ect which leads to higher wages of complementary workers which was not obvious at …rst sight. However, this employment e¤ ect on wages is intensi…ed: not only wages are higher, but also overall employment. Employment was always higher in case II than case I and sometimes also wages. Therefore, the parameter space where unions prefer II to I is larger than the parameter space where wages are higher under II than I. The same is true for I and III and III and IV .
What does that mean economically? When a union has a high bargaining strength the union wants to negotiate in one negotiation with complementary workers and the …rm instead of two separate negotiations where both unions negotiate separately. This is di¤erent from the well known fact that complementary workers should negotiate separately. Case II is equivalent to case V where unions of complementary workers merge. These joint negotiation always lead to higher employment and sometimes also to higher wages. However, only the strong unions prefer the single table negotiations, the weak one always prefers the separate. For the …rms the situation is easier. They always prefer joint negotiations yielding a larger quantity.
The comparison between III and IV is similar. In case III the two industry unions negotiate separately with the two …rms. In case IV on industry wide negotiation between the two …rms and the two unions take place. As long as quantities are always higher with one industry wide negotiation, …rms prefer that scenario. However, also strong unions prefer this setting. Their wages are higher with a joint negotiation and also employment is higher. Only the weak union always prefers the separate negotiations. Again, it is not true to state that it is always in the interest of workers not to negotiate with complementary workers. With heterogeneous bargaining strength, this is only true for workers with a lower bargaining strength.
Comparing cases I and III shows that …rms always favor higher production in case I: That was not surprising since in case I each …rm negotiates alone with each of its crafts and in case III each …rm has to agree in one negotiation round with its competitor and one industry craft union. This was the worst situation for …rms where substitutable worker form a coalition but not the …rms. However, sometimes also weak unions can prefer I over III. Here the result is again that it is not always in the interest of a union to negotiate together with substitutable workers.
The last comparison is between I and IV . Here, higher employment in case I does not matter. The union always prefers the higher wages; the higher employment cannot outweigh lower wages. So, the ranking of union utility is equal to the ordering of wages.
Welfare
Welfare is de…ned here as the sum of consumer surplus, pro…ts, and union utility.
Welfare is in its ordering exactly equal to the ordering of quantities and pro…ts. This may be surprising at …rst glance. However, the driving force is that consumer surplus and …rm pro…ts are highly correlated. Firm pro…ts are highest with the highest employment and quantity produced. This is equivalent to low prices and a high consumer surplus. This correlation between …rm pro…ts and consumer surplus is higher than the lower union utility in some cases. This result simpli…es economic advices. As long as consumer surplus and producer surplus is highly correlated, the enforcement of the negotiation regime …rms prefer also enlarges consumer surplus and overall welfare.
Conclusion
In my model, I draw comparisons with horizontal as well as vertical union mergers and allow for di¤erent bargaining strengths. I do not only sort the bargaining cases by wage levels, but by union utility levels. For this to be feasible I have to presuppose a speci…c union utility function.
My results are twofold: First, I can show that results do not di¤er whether unions (or …rms) form an encompassing union (or employers' association) and negotiate internally over the distribution of rents or whether they negotiate as con ‡icting parties in a Nash-Bargaining Solution. This is only true if the bargaining strength of the encompassing union (or employers' association) equals the sum of the individual bargaining strengths. For wage bargains this implies that no di¤erence occur between a one union or a one negotiation framework.
Second, in contrast to the literature I cannot verify that it is always in the interest of complementary workers to be organized in di¤erent unions and to form encompassing unions for substitutable workers. Once one assumes di¤erent union strengths wages can be higher when substitutable workers negotiate alone or when complementary workers form an encompassing union. However, this higher wage e¤ect is reinforced due to higher employment when substitutable workers negotiate separately or complementary workers together. For the simple fact that union utility increases in wages and employment it is sometimes utility enhancing for complementary unions to negotiate together and for substitutable unions to negotiate alone.
Thus, di¤erent bargaining strengths complicate the comparison. Unions have di¤erent incentives to form encompassing union or to negotiate together and this strongly depends on their relative bargaining strength.
The model di¤ers from the previous literature in multiple ways: The main idea is that bargaining agents do not necessarily have the same bargaining strength during negotiations. With regard to wage negotiations, incentives for …rms to form an employers'association or for unions to form encompassing unions di¤er due to heterogeneous bargaining strengths. Dowrick only deals with horizontal union mergers and in his model unions and …rms always have a symmetric bargaining strength. However, Gürtzgen extends Dowrick's model to vertical union mergers but she refrains from wage negotiations and thus heterogeneous bargaining strength. Aab (a + b + 8c) (a + b + 2c) (3ab + 8ac + 8bc + 16c 2 ) > 0:
B.2 Proposition 3
As long as pro…ts in all regimes are squared quantities, the results for wages apply to pro…ts.
